When the Empire Strikes
Inside the U.S. Attack on Iran and What Comes Next
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When the Empire Strikes: Inside the U.S. Attack on Iran and What Comes Next
On Saturday, June 21, 2025, at approximately 6:40 PM (ET), the United States launched a successful strike on Iranian nuclear enrichment facilities. Seven B-2 bombers dropped 12 GBU-57 MOPs on Fordow and two on Natanz, while striking Isfahan with Tomahawk cruise missiles.
The attack was historic for several reasons. First, it marked the inaugural deployment of this type of bunker buster bomb, the most powerful non-nuclear weapon in existence. Second, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Lt. Gen. Dan Caine noted in yesterday’s press conference, the United States had kept a military option on the back burner for fifteen years, developing the capabilities necessary to strike if and when the moment arose. From the Obama administration’s authorization of the research and development of the 30,000-pound MOP, to Biden’s detailing of a strategic military plan of attack, to Trump’s decision to carry out the strike, the United States maintained multiple courses of action to ensure Iran would never obtain a nuclear weapon.
Third, as Nadav Eyal noted on Dan Senor’s “Call Me Back” podcast, President Trump thanked Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the IDF in his press conference following the operation, confirming their close coordination all along. The United States’ decision to join this war, Eyal said, was remarkable.
Why now? Iran was closer than ever to a nuclear weapon, and the United States had an unprecedented window of opportunity to carry out the military option. Its calculus considered, in large part, Israel’s recent degradation of Iranian air defenses and elimination of key military personnel and nuclear scientists. It also factored in Israel’s success in weakening the so-called “Axis of Resistance.” In the past, including during the previous Trump administration, Hamas, Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies served as part of a larger deterrence strategy. From the United States and Israel’s perspective, a direct attack on Iran might trigger a broader regional war that no American president was interested in pursuing. With little public appetite for entering yet another Middle East conflict, Presidents Obama, Biden and Trump all refrained from carrying out a strike.
Iran responded to Saturday’s operation by launching 14 missiles at the United States’ Al-Udeid air base in Qatar in a coordinated and symbolic response that targeted American assets in the region. Iran warned the United States and Qatar in anticipation of the attack, allowing American personnel to evacuate in advance. It appears the regime’s strategic calculus determined that a full-scale retaliation would have catastrophic consequences. Rather than escalate the conflict, Iran attempted to save face domestically by launching an orchestrated strike, given its clearly weaker position.
Iran employed a strategy nearly identical to that following the January 2020 U.S. assassination of IRGC commander Qassem Soleimani, firing more than a dozen missiles at two Iraqi bases hosting U.S. military personnel. In both instances, Iran provided advanced warning to the United States and Iraq, signaling that the strikes were intended to show strength to Iran’s domestic audience rather than truly inflict damage. Ayatollah Khamenei described both the 2020 and 2025 attacks as a “slap in the face” to the United States. Nevertheless, the regime understands that the United States poses an existential threat to its rule, and any escalation toward a broader regional or global conflict would likely result in its downfall.
Over the past week, U.S. intelligence agencies have offered varying assessments of the damage inflicted on Iran’s enrichment facilities, as well as the overall extent to which the strikes set back its nuclear program. Israeli intelligence assessments indicate significant damage, while President Trump claims complete destruction. Chairman Caine described the damage as “severe,” and Iranian Foreign Minister Esmail Baghaei characterized it as “excessive and serious.” Ayatollah Khamenei unsurprisingly dismissed the U.S. strike, claiming it “did not achieve anything significant.” The truth likely lies somewhere in the middle.
The most serious question, however, remains the location of the 400 kg of enriched uranium Iran reportedly removed from Fordow before the U.S. attack, which it could use as leverage to shape a more favorable outcome. Even if the sites at Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan are “totally obliterated,” as President Trump claims, Iran may still operate other undisclosed enrichment sites elsewhere in the country. Alternatively, it could acquire new centrifuges from Russia or North Korea to complete the enrichment process from 60-90 percent and produce at least a few warheads, with some sources estimating as many as nine. Additionally, despite Israel’s successful targeting of top Iranian nuclear scientists, the knowledge has not been entirely erased. While Iran is undeniably the weaker actor, in coercive diplomacy, the weaker side always has agency.
At this point, Iran has several courses of action that will clarify its true intentions. It could race to 90 percent enrichment and take the final steps toward weaponization. It could leave the international nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which would indicate its remaining will to pursue a nuclear program. It could rebuild or acquire new centrifuges or simply build a dirty bomb with existing radioactive material and conventional explosives. All of these escalatory paths would lead to the collapse of the current ceasefire and significantly lower the likelihood of a diplomatic outcome.
Although unlikely at this point, Iran could still attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz to disrupt global oil markets. Thus far, prices have remained relatively stable, despite earlier fears of a triple digit surge. An actual closure, however, would almost certainly send prices soaring. Iran recognizes that such a move would primarily hurt China, which receives roughly 90 percent of Iranian oil exports. It would be unwise, therefore, for Tehran to pursue an escalatory strategy that damages both China’s and its own economy, not to mention the economies of the Gulf states, with which Iran has recently improved ties.
While Iran has an opportunity to end its diplomatic isolation, the regime still views nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles as essential to its sovereignty. Iran must now decide whether to accept the loss and return to the negotiating table or continue down the path of defiance and aggression.